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ABSTRACT 
A self-control procedure that involved a later onset of a stimulus signalling a 
small reinforcer within the waiting time for a larger reinforcer was investigated to 
determine a point of shifting preference and a discounting function as the delay 
varied. The results from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3 showed exclusive 
impulsive choices regardless of the delay. In order to examine if the results were 
due to the procedure and the parameters, or the species used, Experiment 4 
attempted to obtain shifts in preference using simultaneous onset of stimuli with 
the same species. The results demonstrated no changes in preference but an 
increase in proportion of self-control choices was shown. Due to the limited 
information from the replicated studies, the accounts for the results could not be 
concluded. The explanations derived from choice models seemed most plausible, 
but limitations of the choice models were discussed.  
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All behaviour involves making choices. When the choice results in a 
desirable outcome in the long term, this is regarded as an act of self-control 
(Logue, 1988). One example of self-control is when a high school graduate 
chooses not to work right away for a less satisfying wage, but chooses to pursue 
further education to obtain a job with better pay rate later on. Impulsiveness is the 
opposite of self-control in which a short-term outcome with less reinforcing value 
is chosen (Logue, 1988). An impulsive act would be that the high school graduate 
chooses to work right away, foregoing the opportunity of securing a job with a 
better pay rate later on by not continuing further education. Thus, enhanced self-
control may have a particular long-term advantage in everyday life.  
In addition, self-control is of clinical importance because some disorders 
can be considered as a failure of self-control, such as drug abuse and pathological 
gambling (Logue, 1995; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). For example, 
drug abuse can be seen as an attempt to obtain immediate satisfaction while 
ignoring its harm to a person’s health in a long term. Accordingly, self-control is 
important in both everyday life and clinical settings. Research on self-control 
should help us understand how these choices are made, and eventually lead us to 
develop techniques to enhance self-control to promote wellbeing in everyday life, 
as well as in clinical settings. 
Similar to the choices in our everyday life, experimental investigations 
on self-control typically have subjects choose between two simultaneously 
presented schedules of reinforcement in order to receive either a larger reinforcer 
which is available later (LL; also known as larger delayed reinforcer) or a smaller 
reinforcer available sooner (SS; also known as smaller immediate reinforcer), 
where the delay to reinforcers and the magnitude (e.g., amount or duration) of 
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reinforcers are manipulated. If a choice is made for the LL outcome over the SS 
outcome, this choice is defined as self-control, while the opposite choice is 
defined as impulsiveness (Rachlin & Green, 1972; Green, Fisher, Perlow, & 
Sherman, 1981; Logue, 1988).  
Since the larger outcome will only be available after a delay (and another 
delay often applies to the smaller outcome), the relation between the choices and 
the delay to reinforcer has been extensively studied in a number of experiments. 
For example, Green, Fisher, Perlow and Sherman (1981) employed pigeons to 
repeatedly choose between an LL outcome and an SS outcome by a response on 
one of the two keys, representing the LL and SS keys, across different delays. 
Two periods were organised. The trial period lasted for 30 s, and was followed by 
10 s outcome period. This ensured that the total trial duration was kept constant. 
The onset of the trial period was signalled by the activation of houselight. During 
the trial period, two keys were lit simultaneously. The time between the onset of 
keys and the end of trial period, called T, varied from 2 to 28 s. If the red key, the 
choice key, was pecked, pigeons would be offered 2 s access to food followed by 
8 s blackout. In other words, a response made on the red key led to the SS 
outcome. If pigeons pecked the green key, the commitment key, a delay of 4 s to 
reinforcer was effective, and was followed by 6 s food reinforcer. Hence, a peck 
on the green key produced the LL outcome.  
The results obtained by Green et al. (1981) showed a clear demonstration 
of shifting preference by all subjects as a function of delay to reinforcer. 
Specifically, when the T value was 2 s, all birds strongly preferred the SS 
outcome, while all of them changed their preference to the LL outcome when the 
T was 28 s. 
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This change in preference reported by Green et al. (1981) can be described 
and explained by a choice model, the temporal discounting framework. According 
to the discounting framework, the subjective value of a reward is discounted 
progressively as a function of delay (Green & Myerson, 2004). Subjective value 
represents the allocation of the choices for either LL or SS outcome across the 
delay. In Figure 0.1, the y-axis (the vertical axis) represents the subjective value, 
and the x-axis (the horizontal axis) refers to the time or the delay to reinforcer, 
while the heights of the bars represent the actual amounts of two future rewards. 
The two curves are termed discounting functions. They indicate the subjective 
values of the rewards across delay. If a choice is made at Time 1 that has a longer 
delay to reward, the value of LL outcome is discounted less than the value of SS 
outcome at Time 1. In other words, one would choose the LL outcome at this 
point. Time 2 is a point of shifting preference. Before this point where delay to the 
outcomes were shorter, one would prefer the SS outcome. Thus, according to the 
discounting framework, the actual amount of the LL outcome is discounted less 
progressively than that of the SS as the delay increases, and this results in the 
changes in preference.  
This could explain the results from Green et al. (1981) where all pigeons 
shifted preference. According to Figure 0.1, when the T value was 28 s, the value 
of the LL outcome was discounted less than the value of the SS outcome. In this 
case, the LL outcome was strongly preferred. However, when the T value was 2 s, 
the subjective value of LL outcome was less than that of SS outcome, which 
resulted in stronger preference for the SS outcome across all the subjects. 
Changes in preference have also been observed in experiments conducted 
with humans. For example, Green, Fristoe, and Myerson (1994) recruited adults to 
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Figure 0.1. Choice between an LL reward and an SS reward as a function of time. 
The curves represent the discounting subjective values while the 
heights of the bar represent the actual amounts of the rewards. T1 = 
Time 1; T2 = Time 2 (Green & Myerson, 2004). 
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ity discounting (for a review of the temporal discounting literature
from an economic perspective, see Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2002; for discussion of the application of discount-
ing to consumption, savings, asset allocation, and other economic
issues concerning aggregate behavior, see Angeletos, Laibson,
Repetto, Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001; Laibson, 1997; for a
review of the literature on choice under risk, see Starmer, 2000).
We begin by considering choice between delayed rewards and the
role of discounting in preference reversals. We then consider
alternative mathematical descriptions of the relation between sub-
jective value and delay. We go on to extend this work to choice
involving probabilistic rewards and show that the same form of
mathematical discounting functions can be used to describe be-
havior in such situations.
The fact that discounting functions of the same form describe
choice involving delayed and probabilistic rewards raises the ques-
tion of whether temporal and probability discounting both reflect
the same underlying process (Green & Myerson, 1996; Prelec &
Loewenstein, 1991; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986;
Rachlin, Siegel, & Cross, 1994; Stevenson, 1986), and we consider
evidence bearing on this issue. We do so from the perspective of
a general discounting framework that emphasizes the value of
using similar experimental procedures and a common analytical
approach involving the same form of mathematical discounting
function. As a consequence of this similarity in experimental and
analytical approaches, we are better able to evaluate claims re-
garding the adequacy of a single-process account of temporal and
probability discounting.
In subsequent sections, we discuss studies that have compared
discounting in different populations (e.g., individuals from differ-
ent cultures; substance abusers vs. controls) as well as data bearing
on the relationship between behavioral measures of discounting
and psychometric measures of impulsivity. Finally, we discuss
areas in which further research is called for, such as the need to
study behavior in more complex choice situations in which the
outcomes have probabilistic and delayed as well as positive and
negative aspects.
Discounting and Choice Between Delayed Rewards
The classic example of discounting involves choice between a
larger and a smaller reward, where the smaller reward is available
sooner than the larger one. Although an individual may choose the
larger, later reward when both alternatives are well in the future,
with the passage of time, preference may reverse so that the
individual now chooses the smaller, sooner reward. For example,
one might prefer to receive $100 right now rather than $120 one
month from now. Nevertheless, if the choice were between $100 in
1 year and $120 in 13 months, then one might choose the $120.
Notice that preference reverses as an equal amount of time is
added to the delay until both outcomes. Similarly, a student might
well watch a favorite movie on television Friday evening rather
than work on an extracredit assignment due the following week
that will raise the student’s course grade. This might happen even
though several days earlier the student had indicated a preference
for working on the paper Friday night rather than watching the
movie.
Such preference reversals have been diagrammed as shown in
Figure 1. The vertical axis represents the subjective, or discounted,
value of a future reward, and the horizontal axis represents time.
The heights of the bars represent the actual reward amounts. The
curves show how their subjective values might change as a func-
tion of the time at which the rewards were evaluated. Such curves
are termed discounting functions because they indicate how the
value of a future reward is discounted when it is delayed. Accord-
ing to the representation in Figure 1, if one were offered a choice
between the smaller, sooner and the larger, later rewards at Time
1, one would choose the larger, later reward, whereas if one were
offered a choice between the same rewards at Time 2, one would
choose the smaller, sooner reward.
According to the discounting account, preference reversals oc-
cur because the subjective value of smaller, sooner rewards in-
creases more than that of larger, later rewards when there is an
equivalent decrease in the delays to the two rewards (as shown in
Figure 1). The preference reversals described previously seem
intuitively correct, but do they actually occur? If so, they violate
the stationarity assumption that underlies the discounted utility
model of classical economic theory (i.e., the assumption that if A
is preferred to B at one point in time, it will be preferred at all other
points in time; Koopmans, Diamond, & Williamson, 1964; see
Frederick et al., 2002, for a history of the discounted utility model
and a review of the many violations of the model’s assumptions).
The results of studies with both humans and nonhuman animals
clearly violate the stationarity assumption and are consistent with
the discounting account.
For example, in an earlier study by Green, Fisher, Perlow, and
Sherman (1981), pigeons were studied with a procedure like that
shown schematically in Figure 2. The pigeons chose between two
alternatives, a smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later reward, by
pecking at one of two illuminated response keys. In different
conditions, the choice was presented at different points in time
within the 30-s trial period. For example, in one condition, the
choice was presented 28 s before the outcome period (see the top
diagram in Figure 2), whereas in another condition, the choice was
presented 2 s before the outcome period (see the bottom diagram
in Figure 2).
Figure 1. Choice between a smaller reward, available sooner (SS), and a
larger reward, available later (LL). The curved lines represent change in
subjective value as a function of time. The heights of the bars represent the
actual reward amounts. T1 ! Time 1; T2 ! Time 2.
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make a series of choices between two delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. 
The ratio of the SS reward to the LL reward was kept constant ($20 to $50; $100 
to $250; $500 to $1,250) and delays to both rewards increased equally to keep the 
interval between the two rewards constant. The students had to make repeated 
choices as the delay increased. For example, a student might be asked to choose 
$20 in one week or $50 in three months and one week, and then he/she might be 
asked again to choose between $20 in three months and $50 in six months. The 
results obtained by Green, Fristoe and Myerson (1994) showed that while the time 
interval between two rewards was kept constant, the increment of delay to both 
rewards resulted in an increased number of students who preferred the LL reward 
to the SS reward. That is, the preference shifted as the delay increased, as 
described by the temporal discounting framework. 
To describe the temporal discounting, mathematical functions have been 
developed. Generally, discounting occurs when an amount, A, is reduced by a 
discounting variable, !, to a subjective value, V. The V value is less than the 
amount and ! is a fraction (0 ! ! ! 1) (e.g., Rachlin, 2006). It is expressed as: 
                                           
! 
V = "A  or 
! 
V
A
= "
!
.                                            (1) 
However, the discounting variable, !, is dimensionless, and hence, cannot be 
applied directly.  
In economics, the exponential discounting function was proposed, in 
which ! = e-KD. That is:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! 
V = Ae
"KD
 ,                                                 (2) 
where D is the delay to reward, e is a mathematical constant, and K is a parameter 
that determines the discounting rate (Samuelson, 1937). However, as the 
exponential discounting function is based on an early assumption that the 
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discounting rates, K, for both of the LL and the SS rewards are the same, this 
discounting function should be rejected. For example, Rachlin and Jones (2008) 
argued that the exponential discounting function would suggest that when the 
values of two future rewards with different amounts and different delays are 
discounted temporally with the same rate, the two exponential discounting 
functions will never cross. This means changes in preference would never occur, 
and that the LL reward would always have a higher subjective value than the SS 
reward. In other words, human should never act impulsively. Indeed, the basic 
assumption of this economic conceptualisation is that human behave “rationally”, 
and hence, it would not be surprising that the exponential discounting functions 
do not predict changes in preference per se (Mazur, 2006; Green & Myerson, 
2004). Accordingly, the exponential discounting framework cannot sufficiently 
describe the evidence from everyday life that humans frequently act impulsively, 
or the laboratory results from the above outlined experiments.  
Nevertheless, Green and Myerson (1993) suggested that the assumption 
that discounting rates for both the LL reward and the SS reward are the same is 
incorrect. Thus, if the discounting rates for the two rewards are different, the two 
exponential discounting functions do cross. Kagel, Green and Caraco (1986) 
argued that if this exponential discounting function can provide an accurate 
description, the discounting as a function of delay is really due to the risk 
involved when waiting for the reward. That is, it is always a possible that the 
subject will not receive the reward at the end of the waiting, and hence, making 
the discounting of LL reward value less steep than that of SS reward (i.e., the K 
value is smaller for the LL reward than that of the SS reward). 
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Behavioural economists argue that the discounting function is a hyperbola 
(Rachlin, 2006; Green & Myerson, 2004). That is:  
                                                 
! 
" =
1
1+ # !
,                                                   (3) 
where " (" " 0) controls the discounting degree. However, " is also dimensionless. 
In order to account for the effects of delay to reward, the dimensions of delay and 
discounting rate are added to the variable, ". That is, " = KD. In this case, the 
discounting function would be (Mazur, 1987):  
                                               
! 
V =
A
1+ KD !
.                                                  (4) 
According to Equation 4, even if the discounting rates, K, for the LL reward and 
the SS reward are the same, the discounting functions will cross. In other words, 
the hyperbolic discounting function should be able to describe shifts in preference 
as seen above. If the hyperbolic discounting function can provide an accurate 
description of discounting data, according to Green and Myerson (2004), “choices 
between different times are really choices between different rates of reward” (p. 
772).  
A generalised version of the hyperbolic discounting function has been 
suggested to include a power parameter (Rachlin, 2006):  
                                               
! 
V =
A
1+ KD
S
!
.                                                (5) 
In this hyperbola-like function, the added parameter, s, represents the sensitivity 
towards to the delay. This suggestion stemmed from the power law (Stevens, 
1957), which states that the relation between a psychological response and its 
physical dimension or stimulus is a power function. In this case, the psychological 
response, sensitivity, exponentiates its physical dimension, delay. 
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Another hyperbola-like discounting function based on Equation 4 was 
suggested by Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994):!
                                              
! 
V =
A
(1+ KD)
S
!
.                                               (6) 
In this equation, the parameter, s, is the power function of the entire denominator. 
Owing to the inclusion of sensitivity, this equation also fits the power law. 
Rachlin (2006) pointed out that in some cases, sensitivity exponent is a unity (s = 
1). In this case, both Equation 5 and Equation 6 reduce to Equation 4. He also 
suggested that the sensitivity exponent for delay would usually be close to 1. 
To determine which discounting function can provide the best description, 
different discounting curves are mapped out for the estimated subjective values 
calculated from these discounting functions across different delays. These 
discounting curves are then compared to the actual data collected (Green & 
Myerson, 2004). The best fit will provide the largest proportion of variance 
accounted for, R2. Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991) compared exponential 
discounting function (Equation 2) to the simple hyperbolic function (Equation 4) 
with humans as participants. An amount of hypothetical money of $1000 delayed 
from 1 month to 50 years was displayed to the participants while an immediate 
amount of hypothetical monetary reward (from $1 to $1000) was displayed one 
by one, next to the delayed reward, as the delays increased. Participants were to 
choose between the immediate reward and the delayed reward across its delays. 
Their results are shown in Figure 0.2, which clearly demonstrated that the simple 
hyperbolic function (Equation 4) provided a much better fit than the exponential 
function (Equation 2). Specifically, the hyperbola accounted for 99.5% of the 
variance.  
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Figure 0.2. Subjective value of a hypothetical delayed $1000 reward 
decreases as delay increases. From Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross 
(1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.3. Subjective value of a hypothetical delayed $10000 reward 
decreases as delay increases. From Green and Myerson (2004). 
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Fig. 6. Distributions of individual certain-immediate
amounts equivalent to $1,000 with various delays.
and tends to confirm the speculation of Rachlin
et al. (1986) that stated probability and stated
delay have corresponding effects on behavior.
As a further test of this speculation, another
experiment was performed to find points of
indifference between a probabilistic reward on
the one hand and a delayed reward of equal
amount on the other hand rather than (as in
Experiment I) between a probabilistic or de-
layed reward on the one hand and an imme-
diate-certain reward of varying amount on the
other.
EXPERIMENT II
Setting the delay discount function given by
Equation 2a equal to the probability discount
function given by Equation 5 produces:
Vp1 = Vd
V V
1 + hO 1 + kd
d= (h/k)0 (9)
In the present experiment subjects chose be-
tween certain but delayed rewards and prob-
abilistic but immediate rewards. If the prob-
ability and delay discount functions do indeed
0 100 200 300 400 600 600
DELAY (months)
Fig. 7. Amount of certain-immediat money equiva-
lent to $1,000 with v rious delay The crosses are medians
of individual subjects' points of indifference. Perpendicular
bars (and small squares) represent interquartile ranges.
The solid line is the best fitting hyperbolic function of
delay. The segmented line is the best fitting exponential
function.
have the same form, Equation 9 should hold
and a simple proportionality should be found
between values of odds against (0) and delay
that produce equivalent discounts of a $1,000
reward.
METHOD
Subjects
Forty students enrolled in an undergraduate
psychology course at the State University of
New York at Stony Brook served as subjects.
Their participation was a course requirement.
Materials
Two sets of cards were presented in pairs
to the subjects. One set of cards offered the
subjects a probabilistic $1,000. The probabil-
ities (again represented as percentages) were
the same as those used in Experiment I. The
other set of cards presented $1,000 to be ob-
tained after a delay. The delay values used
were 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5
years, 10 years, 17 years, 25 years, 50 years,
and 100 years.
MONTHS
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preferred to the delayed reward. To control for order effects, the
point at which preference reverses is redetermined, this time be-
ginning with an amount of the imme iate reward similar to that of
the delayed reward so that the immediate reward is preferred. The
amount of immediate reward is then successively decreased until
the delayed reward is preferred. The average of the two amounts at
which preference reversed is taken as an estimate of the subjective
value of the delayed reward (i.e., the amount of an immediate
reward that is judged equal in value to the delayed reward).
To map out a discounting function, subjective value is estimated
at a number of different delays. Figure 6 shows representative data
(group medians) for delayed hypothetical $10,000 rewards ob-
tained by Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) using this psych phys-
ical method and subsequently fit with different equations by My-
erson and Green (1995). As may be seen, the exponential
(Equation 1; dashed curve) provided the poorest fit, systematically
overpredicting the subjective values at briefer delays and under-
predicting the subjective values at longer delays. The hyperbola
(Equation 2; dashed-and-dotted curve) provided a much better fit,
although it, too, tended to systematically overpredict the subjective
values at briefer delays and underpredict the subjective values at
longer delays.
The finding that temporal discounting is better described by a
hyperbola than by an exponential has been replicated in study after
study (e.g., Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Kirby, 1997;
Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995; Kirby & Santiesteban, 2003; Rachlin et
al., 1991; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000). Although the difference in
the proportion of variance accounted for (R2) is small in some of
these studies (e.g., Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995), it should be noted
that in others the difference in the proportion of variance ac-
counted for is substantial. In Figure 6, for example, the exponential
(Equation 1) accounts for 81.5% of the variance, whereas the
hyperbola (Equation 2) accounts for 93.7% (for another particu-
larly striking example, see Rachlin et al., 1991, Figure 7).
It can be seen that Equation 3 (solid curve) provided the best fit
to the data in Figure 6 (R2! .977). It is well known, of course, that
simply adding a free parameter to a model tends to increase the
proportion of variance accounted for. Therefore, to make the case
that Equation 3 provides a better model of discounting, one must
take into account considerations in addition to the increase in the
value of R2 relative to a simple hyperbola or exponential function.
One of the most fundamental of these considerations is whether the
differences in the proportion of variance accounted for are statis-
tically significant. This question may be addressed by using a
statistical approach analogous to the comparison of linear regres-
sion models. That is, one may compare a reduced model (a
hyperbola without the exponent parameter) with a full model (one
that includes the exponent parameter).
With respect to the group median data depicted in Figure 6,
Myerson and Green (1995) reported that adding an exponent
produced a statistically significant increase in the proportion of
variance accounted for. This finding has subsequently been repli-
cated in further studies from our laboratory (Green et al., 1999a;
Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998) as well as in reanalyses of
data from other laboratories described in subsequent sections
(Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, &
Bickel, 1997; Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001; Raineri &
R chlin, 1993). Thus, the increase in the proportion of variance
explained by Equation 3 is significantly greater than would be
expected simply on the basis of the fact that it has two free
paramet rs whereas Equations 1 and 2 each have only one.
Figure 6. The subjective value of a elayed $10,000 reward plotted as a
function of the time until its receipt. The curved lines repr sent alternative
forms of the temporal discounting function (Equations 1, 2, and 3) fit to the
data. Data are from “Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span
Comparison,” by L. Green, A. F. Fry, and J. Myerson, 1994, Psychological
Science, 5, p. 35. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishers, Limited.
Reprinted with permission.
Figure 5. Procedure for studying temporal discounting. Each of the
rectangles represents one of a series of successive choices between a
smaller, sooner and a larger, later reward in which the amount of the
smaller reward is increased until it is preferred to the larger reward.
773A DISCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
       0        60        120        180       240        300 
 $10000 
   
 
   $8000 
 
 
   $6000 
 
 
   $4000 
 
 
   $2000 
 
 
         $0 
 
S
u
b
je
ct
iv
e 
V
al
u
e 
Exponential 
Hyperbolic 
Hyperbola-like 
function (Equation 
6) 
 
 
 
!
preferred to the delayed reward. To control for order effects, the
point at which preference reverses is redetermined, this time be-
ginning with an amount of the immediate reward similar to that of
the delayed reward so that the immediate reward is preferred. The
amount of immediate reward i then successively decreased ntil
the delayed reward is preferred. The average of th tw a ounts at
which preference reversed is taken as an estimate of the subjective
value of the delayed reward (i.e., the amount of an immediate
reward that is judged equal in value to the delayed reward).
To m p out a discounting function, s bjective value is stimated
a number of differe t de ays. Figure 6 shows representative data
(group medians) for delayed hypothetical $10,000 rewards ob-
tained by Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) using this psychophys-
ical method and subsequently fit with different equations by My-
erson and Green (1995). As may be seen, the exponential
(Equation 1; dashed curve) provided the poorest fit, systematically
overpredicting the subjective values at briefer delays and under-
predicting the subjective values at longer delays. The hyperbola
(Equation 2; dashed-and-dotted curve) provided a much better fit,
although it, too, tend d to systematically overpredict the subj ctive
values at briefer delays and underp e ict the subjective values at
longer delays.
The finding that temporal discounting is better described by a
hyperbola than by an exponential has been replicated in study after
study (e.g., Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Kirby, 1997;
Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995; Kirby & Santiesteban, 2003; Rachlin et
al., 1991; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000). Although the difference in
the proportion of variance accounted for (R2) is small in some of
these studies (e.g., Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995), it should be noted
that in others the difference in the proportion of variance ac-
counted for is substantial. In Figure 6, for example, the exponenti l
(Equation 1) accounts for 81.5% of the variance, whereas the
hyperbola (Equation 2) accounts for 93.7% (for another particu-
larly striking example, see Rachlin et al., 1991, Figure 7).
It can be seen that Equation 3 (solid curve) provided the best fit
to the data in Figure 6 (R2! .977). It is well known, of course, that
simply adding a free parameter to a model tends to increase the
proportion of variance accounted for. Therefore, to make the case
that Equation 3 provides a better model of discounting, one must
take into account considerations in addition to the incr ase in the
value of R2 relative to a simp e hyp rbola or exponential function.
One of the most fundamental of these considerations is whether the
differences in the proportion of variance accounted for are statis-
tically significant. This question may be addressed by using a
statistical approach analogous to the comparison of linear regres-
sion models. That is, one may compare a reduced model (a
hyperbola without the exponent parameter) with a full model (one
that includes the exponent parameter).
With respect to the group median data depicted in Figure 6,
Myerson and r (1995) reported that dding an exponent
produced a statisti ll significant increase in the proportion of
variance accounted for. This finding has subsequently been repli-
cated in further studies from our laboratory (Green et al., 1999a;
Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998) as well as in reanalyses of
data from other laboratories described in subsequent sections
(Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, &
Bickel, 1997; Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001; Raineri &
Rachlin, 1993). Thus, the increase in the proportion of variance
explained by Equation 3 is significantly greater than would be
expected simply on the ba is of the fact that i has two free
arameters whereas Eq ations 1 and 2 ach have only one.
Figure 6. The subjective value of a delayed $10,000 reward plotted as a
function of the time until its receipt. The curved lines represent alternative
forms of the temporal discounting function (Equations 1, 2, and 3) fit to the
data. Data are from “Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span
Comparison,” by L. Green, A. F. Fry, and J. Myerson, 1994, Psychological
Science, 5, p. 35. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishers, Limited.
Reprinted with permission.
Figure 5. Procedure for studying temporal discounting. Each of the
rectangles represents one of a series of successive choices between a
smaller, sooner and a larger, later reward in which the amount of the
smaller reward is increased until it is preferred to the larger reward.
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that in others the difference in the proportion of variance ac-
counted for is substantial. In Figure 6, for example, the exponential
(Equation 1) accounts for 81.5% of the variance, whereas the
hyperbola (Equation 2) accounts for 93.7% (for another particu-
larly striking example, see Rachlin et al., 1991, Figure 7).
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tically significant. This question may be addressed by using a
statistical approach analogous to the comparison of linear regres-
sion models. That is, one may compare a reduced model (a
hyperbola without the exp ent parameter) with a full model (one
t at includes the exponent parameter).
With respect to the group median data depicted in Figure 6,
Myerson and Green (1995) reported th a ding an exponent
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cated in further s u ies from our laboratory (Green e al., 1999a;
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Figure 6. The subjective value of a delayed $10,000 reward p otted as a
function of the time until its receipt. The curved lines represent alternative
forms of the temporal discounting function (Equations 1, 2, and 3) fit to the
data. Data are from “Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span
Compa son,” by L. Green, A. F. Fry, and J. Myerson, 1994, Psychological
Science, 5, p. 35. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishers, Limited.
Repr nted with permission.
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smaller, sooner and a larger, later reward in which the amount of the
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Similarly, Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) recruited human participants, 
including children, young adults and older adults. The participants were required 
to make a series of choices between a fixed-amount hypothetical monetary reward 
(e.g., $1000 and $10000) offered after a varying delay (e.g., 1 week to 25 years) 
and an immediate hypothetical monetary reward varying from 0.1% to 100% of 
the delayed reward (e.g., $1 to $1000). Their results showed that, for young 
adults, Equation 6 accounted for 99.7% and 97.7% of the variances for $1000 and 
$10000 delayed rewards respectively. For older adults, Equation 6 accounted for 
99.5% and 99.9% of the variances for $1000 and $10000 delayed rewards 
correspondingly. For children, Equation 6 accounted for 94.5% and 99.5% of the 
variances for $100 and $1,000 delayed rewards respectively. Green and Myerson 
(2004) later re-analysed Green, Fry and Myerson’s (1994) results of young adults 
discounting $10000 across different delays. They found that the exponential 
function (Equation 2) provided the poorest fit, it accounted for only 81.5% of the 
variance. The simple hyperbolic function (Equation 4) accounted for 93.7% of the 
variance, hence, provided better fit. Nevertheless, Equation 6, the hyperbola-like 
function, accounted for 97.7% of variance (see Figure 0.3, for a graphical 
comparison), suggesting that Equation 6 is superior in fitting the discount data 
than exponential and simple hyperbola. 
Rachlin (2006) argued that Equation 5, another hyperbola-like function, 
can also fit the delay discounting data well. In fact, Rachlin (2006) pointed out it 
is not possible to choose between the two hyperbola-like functions (Equation 5 
and Equation 6) based on variance accounted for, R2. Rachlin (2006) re-analysed 
Raineri’s (as cited in Rachlin, 2006) data, where he found that variances 
accounted for from both equations were very high, and were very close to each 
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other. On average, both equations accounted for 99.5% of variance of the delay 
discount data obtained by Raineri (as cited in Rachlin, 2006). Accordingly, it is 
possible to conclude that the two hyperbola-like functions, both Equation 5 and 
Equation 6, can provide much better description of the temporal discounting data 
than exponential discounting function and the simple hyperbolic function. 
To date, most of the self-control studies use a procedure that starts the 
delays to the LL outcome and the SS at the same time. This is organised by 
presenting two or more reinforcement schedules simultaneously to an organism. 
For example, Rachlin and Green (1972) used a chained procedure where two 
white keys were lit simultaneously in the initial link, and the pigeons had to 
distribute an FR 25 requirement over two keys, a commitment key and a choice 
key. The final response determined the choice between the two keys. If the choice 
key was chosen, another set of two keys with different colours were presented 
simultaneously again in the terminal link for the pigeons to make one more 
choice. 
Another extensively employed procedure in the self-control studies is the 
discrete trial procedure. In this procedure, an organism is required to make a 
choice between two simultaneously presented discriminative stimuli, followed by 
a reinforcer associated with the chosen stimulus after some delay. This procedure 
was used by Green et al. (1981) as outlined above, in which the subjects needed to 
make a response on either of the simultaneously lit side keys to receive the 
associated reinforcer. 
Mischel (1974) used a unique procedure to investigate self-control in 
children where only a single operative stimulus was used. Children in this study 
were to choose between a pretzel (i.e., the LL reward) and animal crackers (i.e., 
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the SS reward). In order to receive the pretzel, children needed to sit quietly for  
15 min. The trial could be terminated by ringing a bell at any time during the 
waiting, and only animal crackers were offered afterwards. Even though only a 
single operative stimulus was employed in this study, the delay to the SS outcome 
and the LL outcome started at the same time.  
In the temporal discounting literature, variations of the discrete trial 
procedure were developed. For example, Mazur (1987) introduced an adjusting-
delay procedure, in which the delay to reinforcer was continuously adjusted based 
on the results of subject’s preceding trial. If the subject chose the SS outcome in 
one block of trials, the delay to LL outcome in the following block would 
decrease. Likewise, if the subject chose the LL outcome in one block of trials, the 
delay to LL outcome in the next block of trials would increase. The purpose of 
this procedure was to find the indifference points where the subject chose two 
outcomes equally often. Recently, Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, and Seiden (1997) 
developed an adjusting-amount procedure for use with rats. In their procedure, the 
rats were to choose between an SS outcome, a smaller amount of water, and an 
LL outcome, a larger amount of water. If the SS outcome was chosen, the amount 
of the SS outcome would decrease, and if the LL outcome was chosen, the 
amount of the SS outcome would increase. Richards et al. (1997) then varied 
delay to LL outcome to find out the indifference points at these delays. Although 
in these two studies some variations were made to the discrete trial procedure in 
order to adjust the procedure to accommodate the research interest, these two 
variations still have two stimuli simultaneously presented to the subjects. 
All of the above experimental procedures used in self-control studies 
attempted to describe a scenario where an organism tries to choose between two 
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options that are offered at the same time. Regrettably, this will often fail to match 
the real world choice scenarios. Consider that a pathological gambler has 
committed not to gamble again, but at a later time, this gambler comes across a 
gambling facility. Now the question is raised as to whether or not this gambler 
would start gambling again. 
To address the above scenario, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) developed a 
procedure with pigeons as their subjects, where the SS alternative appeared during 
the waiting for the LL outcome. They attempted to investigate if the pigeons’ 
choice distributions were affected by the point when the SS alternative appeared 
during the waiting. They also aimed to investigate the differences in pigeons’ 
performance maintained by three schedules, a fixed interval (FI) 10 s, a fixed time 
(FT) 10 s, and a differential reinforcement of other behaviour (DRO) 10 s 
schedules.  
Their procedure is presented in Figure 0.4. Before the start of a trial, the 
central key was lit white. A single peck on the central key would start the trial and 
darken the central key. At the beginning of the trial, one of the side keys was lit 
green, called the LL key. The LL key was associated with one of the three 
schedules and the following LL outcome, 6 s access to food. If FI 10 s schedule 
was in effect, a peck on the LL key after 10 s had elapsed would be followed by 
the LL outcome. If the FT 10 s was operative, no responses were required and the 
LL outcome would be automatically available after 10 s delay. If the DRO 10 s 
was in effect, the LL outcome would only be available after 10 s without a 
response. If a response was made during the DRO 10 s, the 10 s delay would 
restart. The other side key was lit red after a predetermined delay from the start of 
the trial, called the SS key. The SS key was associated with the immediate 1.5 s 
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Figure 0.4. The experimental procedure used in Ishii and Sakagami (2002). 
Whether a response was required preceding the receipt of the 
LL outcome was dependent on the condition. 
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access to food (i.e., the SS outcome). The interval between the start of the trial (or 
the onset of the LL key) and the onset of the SS key was termed schedule of 
asynchrony (SOA) (Ishii & Sakagami, 2002). The SOA varied from 0 to 9 s. 
Hence, the onset of SS key was always before the LL outcome being available. 
Once the SS key was available, a single response on it would terminate the LL 
key, and the SS outcome would be offered immediately. 
The results of Ishii and Sakagami (2002) showed that the number of 
impulsive choices was higher in the DRO 10 s condition than the FI and FT 10 s 
conditions. They argued that the contingency associated with the DRO 10 s, 
which was to reset the 10 s delay if a response was made, was a punishment. This 
resulted in a decreased number of self-control choices being made. However, the 
FI and FT 10 s conditions produced similar number of self-control choices being 
made under these two conditions. 
More importantly, consistent with the self-control and temporal 
discounting literature, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) showed that pigeons shifted 
preference from choosing the SS outcome when the SOA value was 0 s to the LL 
outcome when the SOA value was 9 s in the FI and FT conditions. This was 
explained in terms of the shortened delay to LL outcome. That is, as the SOA 
value increased, the delay to LL outcome decreased.  
As argued above, most of the self-control studies cover only one scenario 
where two options were offered at the same time, while Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002) presented an alternative scenario in their study where one alternative, the 
SS option, was offered during the waiting for LL outcome. More importantly, 
Ishii and Sakagami (2002) also found shifts in preference comparable to the self-
control studies using simultaneous onset of stimuli. Thus, it is also reasonable to 
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expect that the temporal discounting functions will provide an accurate 
description of their results. In fact, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) argued that their 
results should be readily described by the discounting functions. Unfortunately, 
their results were not quantitatively analysed by using any of the previously 
outlined discounting functions. Without sufficient raw data presented in their 
study, re-analysing their results using discounting functions is not possible. Thus, 
whether or not their results could actually be described by the discounting 
functions is still unresolved. Nevertheless, if the temporal discounting functions 
can provide accurate descriptions of the results in this procedure, it is also 
possible that the framework can predict the future choice distributions in similar 
choice scenarios where the SS alternative appeared during the waiting, and thus, 
may help to prevent making an impulsive choice in these scenarios. 
Thus, the present study aims to replicate part of Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002), using only the FI condition where FI 10 s schedules was associated with 
the LL outcome and the FR 1 schedule was associated with the SS outcome. It is 
anticipated that the subjects will demonstrate shifts in preference from SS 
outcome to LL outcome as SOA value increases. More importantly, if changes in 
preference are found in the present study, the temporal discounting framework can 
be used to describe the results. Although it was not carried out by Ishii and 
Sakagami (2002), they did suggest this possibility. Thus, this study not only 
serves to validate the procedure itself, but also serves to investigate if the 
temporal discounting functions can indeed provide accurate descriptions of the 
results generated in this procedure. This will also enable the comparison across 
the three discounting functions, the exponential function (Equation 2), the simple 
hyperbolic function (Equation 4) and the hyperbola-like functions (Equation 5 and 
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Equation 6). If an accurate description can be provided by any of these three 
discounting functions, it is possible that this function can also be used to predict 
the future choice distribution of that organism in a similar choice scenario, and 
hence, may be served to help to prevent the impulsive choices being made in the 
future where the SS alternative is encountered during the waiting for the LL 
outcome. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Six Brown Shaver hens (numbered 91 to 96) served as subjects in this 
experiment. Three of these hens (subjects 91, 93 and 95) were one year old, and 
the other three hens were 2 years old (subjects 92, 94 and 96) at the start of this 
experiment. The hens were kept at approximately 80% of their free-feeding body 
weights. In addition to the wheat which was provided as reinforcers in the 
experiment, supplementary feed of commercial layer pellets was also provided if 
necessary. When experimental sessions were not conducted, 50 cc of 
supplementary feed was provided to the hens. The hens were individually housed 
in home cages, measuring 440 mm (height) % 310 mm (width) % 445 mm (length), 
with water freely accessible as well as grit and vitamins provided weekly. All six 
hens had previously participated in experiments. 
 
Apparatus 
The experimental chamber was constructed of particleboards with internal 
dimensions of 510 mm (height) % 414 mm (width) % 522 mm (length). The 
chamber had three circular Perspex response keys with 30 mm in diameter. They 
were located on one end of chamber, called the response wall. The response keys 
could be lit green, red or white. These keys were 65 mm apart from each other, 
and 370 mm above the removable grid floor measuring 345 mm (width) % 395 
mm (length), which was located on top of a metal tray. Two side keys could be lit 
either red or green, and were operative by 28 V multi-chip light-emitting diodes 
(LED), while the central key could be lit white by 28 V single-chip LED. 
19 
 
A response made on the lit key with at least 0.8 N would produce a tone 
sound of 0.05 s, indicating an effective key peck. An overhead houselight located 
in the centre of the top of the chamber was lit by six 3.8 V white LEDs. A fan 
situated on the wall opposite to the response wall was continuously operative, 
providing some masking noise throughout each session.  
A food magazine was located behind an aperture, measuring 70 mm % 100 
mm, on the response wall. The aperture was 120 mm above the floor of the 
experiment chamber. While the magazine was raised to provide access to wheat, it 
was lit with 28 V white single chip based LED and a sensor was also operative to 
record eating time. The key lights and houselight were extinguished when the 
magazine was raised. 
The experiment was run on a personal computer with an Intel® Pentium® 
II processor located away from the experiment chamber in the same room. MED 
PC © IV software controlled experimental events and recorded data. A log book 
was also used to manually record session data for each hen. 
 
Procedure 
An experimental session started after a hen was put in the chamber. The 
experimental events were controlled by the MED PC © software. An 
experimental session was completed when either 40 free choice trials had been 
completed or 40 min had elapsed.  
The colours used in the experiment were predetermined with left key lit 
green and right key lit red. The left green key was associated with an FI 10 s 
schedule and 6 s access to food, and thus, the LL outcome. The subjects were 
required to make a response on this key after 10 s had elapsed in order to receive 
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the food. Thus, the left green key was the LL key. The right red key was 
associated with an FR 1 schedule and 2 s access to food, and hence, the SS 
outcome. That is, the subjects were required to make a single response on this key 
to receive the SS outcome. This key was known as the SS key.  
Each experimental session consisted of 40 free choice trials. A free choice 
trial began with the LL key lit first. During the FI 10 s requirement associated 
with the LL key, the SS key was lit based on the schedule onset asynchrony 
(SOA) value. Only one SOA value was used in an experimental session. The hens 
were required to peck either the LL key after 10 s has elapsed, or the SS key. If 
the FR 1 requirement on the SS key was met, both keys were extinguished, and 
the SS outcome was made available. If the FI 10 s requirement on the LL key was 
met, both keys were extinguished, and the LL outcome was made available. The 
sequence of experimental events was presented in Figure 1.1.  
The current procedure varied slightly from Ishii and Sagakami’s (2002) 
procedure. First, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) used a central key to start a trial. The 
use of a central key seemed superfluous since the start of a trial was also the onset 
of LL key, so the onset of LL key should signal the start of a trial. The other 
feature excluded from the current study was the random but even distribution of 
two colours and their associated contingencies. This pseudo-random distribution 
of two colours was to eliminate the effect of possible position bias. However, if 
the position bias existed, it should be described by the temporal discounting 
function for the LL outcome that the discounting rate, K, may be lower in one 
subject than the others, without the pseudo-random presentation of the two 
colours. For example, if a hen favours the left side, which would make her choose 
the LL key more often, then the discounting rate for the LL outcome will  
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Figure 1.1. The sequence of the experimental events in a free choice trial. 
!
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be lower for her than for the other subjects. Since the discounting rate, K, would 
be able to account for the potential position bias, it seemed unnecessary to include 
the pseudo-random distribution of the two colours and their associated 
contingencies. Finally, the present study used 2 s access to reinforcer instead of 
1.5 s used by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). The 2 s access to reinforcer as the SS 
outcome was usually used in the previous self-control experiments with hens as 
subjects (e.g., McEwan, 1989; McBriar, 1999).  
Preceding the 40 free choice trials, there were eight forced choice trials. A 
forced choice trial consisted with the onset of either of the LL key or the SS key. 
Thus, half of the forced choice trials involved LL key onset only, and the other 
half consisted of SS key onset only. The onset of SS key was according to the 
SOA value used in the following free choice trials. The eight forced choice trials 
were distributed equally on both side keys randomly, with each side key and its 
associated contingencies used for four times.  
For all trials, after making a choice, the magazine was raised and the 
reinforcer was offered. All lights stayed extinguished except for the magazine 
light, signalling the availability of reinforcer. If the SS key was chosen, a blackout 
period was implemented after 2 s consumption of reinforcer. The blackout period 
varied in order to keep the total trial duration constant at 16 s. If the LL key was 
chosen, no blackout period was operative after the consumption of LL outcome. 
An inter-trial interval of 10 s was implemented between the two trials, across all 
the trial including forced choice and free choice trials. 
The SOA value was kept constant during both forced choice trials and free 
choice trials in each experimental session. Each SOA value was an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9 s. If the 0 s SOA was used, both keys were lit at the same 
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time. If the 9 s SOA was used, the SS key was only lit after 9 s had passed since 
the start of trial. Thus, the onset of SS key was always before the completion of 
the requirement on the LL key. There were two series of the SOA values used in 
the sessions. If the ascending series was in effect, the SOA value started from 0 s, 
and then it was increased by 1 s per session until the SOA value reached 9 s. If the 
descending series was used, the SOA value started from 9 s, and then it was 
decreased by 1 s per session until it reached 0 s. Two series were alternated. This 
resulted in each hen experiencing both ascending and descending series of SOA 
values. 
After each ascending and descending series, the proportion of choices 
made for the LL outcome out of the total choices was plotted for each SOA value. 
Visual inspection was used to check the stability. The performance of a subject 
was judged stable when the ascending and descending series produced similar 
data. If the stability criterion was not met, the ascending and descending series 
continued to alternate until the stability criterion was met.  
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RESULTS 
The behaviour of all subjects was judged stable when they completed both 
ascending and descending series. Table 1 shows the order of the series that each 
subject completed. The data from the ascending and descending series from each 
hen were used to calculate the proportion of the LL outcome chosen for each SOA 
value. The results were presented in Figure 1.2, showing the proportions of the LL 
choices for all SOA values in both series for all subjects. Inspection of Figure 1.2 
showed that all subjects tended to choose the SS outcome exclusively regardless 
of the SOA values.  
Some exceptions were noted. During the ascending series, all the subjects, 
except for subject 91, chose the LL outcome occasionally. For example, the 
proportion of the LL choice for subject 96 reached 0.35 when the SOA was 1 s. 
Other subjects, including 92, 93, 94 and 95, all showed occasional choices made 
for LL outcome during the beginning of ascending series. However, all subjects 
exclusively chose the SS outcome later when SOA value increased. For the 
descending series, all subjects tended to exclusively choose the SS outcome, and 
the proportions of the LL outcome chosen were 0.0 throughout the series except  
 
 
Table 1 
The order of the series completed by each subject in Experiment 1 
Hen 
91 92 93 94 95 96 
a, d a, d1 a, d2 a, d a, d a, d 
Note. a and d indicate the ascending series and the descending series respectively. 
The descending series of all of the subjects stopped at 1 s SOA, except for subject 
93. 
1 The results of 5 s SOA was not used as the hen completed that session was 
subject 93 by mistake. 
2 This series stopped at 2 s SOA.  
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Figure 1.2. Proportion of the LL outcome chosen as a function of the schedule 
onset asynchrony for each hen in Experiment 1. The cross (+) 
represents the ascending series, and the circle (!) represents the 
descending series. 
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for subject 95. However, subject 95 only showed some LL choices at the end of 
descending series when SOA values were small. Overall, the results showed 
exclusive SS choices for subjects, regardless of the changing SOA. 
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DISCUSSION 
The current study aimed to replicate the FI condition in Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002). Based on the findings obtained by Ishii and Sakagami (2002), it was 
expected that changes in preference would be observed as a function of changing 
SOA. However, the results of the present experiment showed that all subjects 
almost exclusively chose the SS outcome at all SOA values during both ascending 
and descending series.  
As mentioned, the current procedure did not follow the exact procedure 
used by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). Some features were excluded or altered. It is 
possible that the current results were due to these variations. As outlined, the 
variations included excluding the pseudo-random presentation of two stimuli and 
the central key to initiate a trial, as well as lengthening the SS reinforcer duration 
from 1.5 s to 2 s. Amongst all the variations, it is mostly likely to be a result of 
removing pseudo-random presentation of stimuli. This arrangement was used by 
Ishii and Sakagami (2002) to eliminate the effect of possible position bias. As this 
feature was excluded, it is possible that the current findings of exclusive 
preference for SS outcome were a consequence of a possible position bias. In the 
current experiment, the left key was only lit green and was associated with the FI 
schedule and the LL outcome, while the right key was only lit red and was 
associated with the FR schedule and the SS outcome. If the subjects did prefer the 
right key extremely, it is possible that the subjects would continue to respond on 
the right key regardless of the contingencies on the left key. If this was the case, it 
would explain the exclusive SS choices on the left key.  
To establish a position bias, the behaviour of a subject on the two 
alternatives needed be compared, such as the time the subject spent or the 
28 
 
responses the subject made on the two alternatives. The contingencies on the two 
alternatives need to be the same. For example, free operant access to both 
alternatives would be an ideal way to test a position bias. Unfortunately, the 
position bias cannot be established in this case, given that the current procedure 
employed two different schedules of reinforcement on two keys, and hence, the 
contingencies on the two alternatives were not equal. However, this does not 
exclude the possibility of a potential position bias in favour of the right side. 
The exact cause of the position bias is currently unknown. One possible 
source may be heredity. Baum (1974) argued that if the organism’s musculature 
and/or nervous systems were developed with some asymmetry, the asymmetry 
might contribute to the position bias. One example is the handedness in humans 
(Baum, 1974). However, it is very unlikely that all six subjects have inherent 
favour towards the right side. 
Another possibility was suggested by Kangas and Branch (2008) that the 
bias may be a product of past reinforcement history. That is, if the past 
experiment, in which the subjects served, involved two equal schedules with 
unequal reinforcer magnitudes, the subjects would develop a position bias, 
favouring the side key that was associated with the reinforcer with larger 
magnitude. The acquisition of position bias in this case can occur rapidly. For 
example, Cumming and Berryman (1961) found that all of their subjects 
developed a position bias very quickly in their matching to sample experiment. 
However, it does not seem plausible as the experiment the hens served previously 
only involved a central key. Thus, it is not likely that the previous experiment 
would produce a position bias. 
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It is also possible that the position bias was a result of different response 
strengths required on two keys (Baum, 1974). That is, if the left key required a 
more forceful response, the subjects may prefer the right key as it was easier to 
operate. A post-experiment test on the forces required on the two side keys 
showed that the left key required 0.83 N while the right key required 0.78 N. 
However, the difference in the forces required on the two keys was very small. 
Even if a position bias was due to the unequal forces required on two keys, the 
bias should not be that extreme. 
Although the position bias was not established given the nature of the 
present procedure, nor did the source of this bias, it is still possible to control the 
effect of possible position bias if there was one. It is made possible by including 
the pseudo-random presentation of the two stimuli as used by Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002). If the position bias was indeed responsible for the exclusive SS choices, 
the pseudo-random presentation of the two stimuli should result in the subjects 
sampling the LL outcome when the FI 10 s schedule is presented on the right side. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 attempted to use a procedure that is parallel to a real life 
choice scenario, where an organism may encounter an alternative that has less 
reinforcing value while waiting for a larger reinforcer. In Experiment 1, this was 
arranged with the left side key lit green with FI 10 s schedule and 6 s access to 
reinforcer. The right side key was lit red, and was only associated with FR 1 
schedule and 2 s access to reinforcer. The subjects had to make a choice between 
the two alternatives, but the onsets of two alternatives were not arranged 
simultaneously, except when the SOA value was 0 s.  
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the hens chose the SS outcome 
exclusively. The obtained results may be a consequence of excluding pseudo-
random presentation of the two alternatives. In this case, the effect of a possible 
position bias was not eliminated. Thus, Experiment 2 will organise pseudo-
random distribution of the LL and SS keys between two side keys throughout the 
forced choice trials and the following free choice trials. Should the position bias 
be responsible for the results obtained in Experiment 1, the hens would also 
choose the LL reinforcer in the Experiment 2 when the LL key is presented on the 
right side. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Same as Experiment 1. 
 
Apparatus 
Same as Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
Same as Experiment 1 except that both side keys could be lit either red or 
green. The green colour and the red colour as well as their associated 
contingencies were randomly and evenly distributed between the two side keys. 
This arrangement was in effect throughout the forced choice and free choice trials. 
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RESULTS 
The behaviour of each subject was judged stable after completing both 
ascending and descending series. The order of the series that each of the subjects 
completed is presented in Table 2. The data from the two series were used to 
calculate the proportion of the LL outcome chosen for each SOA value for each 
hen. The proportions of the LL outcome chosen for each SOA value for all 
subjects were presented in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the subjects chose the SS outcome exclusively in the 
current experiment. For example, subjects 92, 93 and 96 did not make any LL 
choice in both series. Some exceptions can also be noted that subjects 91, 94, and 
95 made occasional LL choices in some sessions. However, the proportion of the 
LL choices from these three subjects did not deviate from 0.0 remarkably.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
The order of the series completed by each subject in Experiment 2 
Hen 
91 92 93 94 95 96 
d, a d, a d, a d, a d, a d, a 
Note. a and d indicate the ascending series and the descending series respectively. 
The 0 s SOA value was not used in both ascending and the descending series due 
to a programme error. 
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Figure 2.1. Proportion of the LL outcome chosen as a function of the schedule 
onset asynchrony for each hen in Experiment 2. The cross (+) 
represents the ascending series, and the circle (!) represents the 
descending series. 
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DISCUSSION 
In response to the possible position bias held by the subjects, Experiment 2 
organised a procedure that used pseudo-random presentation of red and green 
keys on two sides with their correspondent contingencies as did by Ishii and 
Sakagami (2002). However, the results of Experiment 2 showed that the 
distribution of choices did not differ from the findings in Experiment 1. Thus, no 
position bias was found, and hence, it could not be responsible for the results in 
Experiment 1. 
However, this does not exclude the possibility of other biases, such as a 
colour bias. The colour associated with the FI 10 s schedule was green and the 
colour associated with the FR 1 schedule was red throughout both experiments. If 
the subjects favour the red colour over the green colour for some reason, they are 
likely to respond on the SS key more often. However, due to the current 
procedural arrangement, this bias cannot be established either. Similar to position 
bias, the exact cause of the colour bias is unknown but it is likely to be heredity 
(Baum, 1974), or past reinforcement history with a colour (Kangas & Branch, 
2008). Nevertheless, it is possible to arrange two different colours to eliminate the 
possible bias in favour of the green colour. 
Moreover, as the current experimental procedure was still not exactly the 
same as the procedure used by Ishii and Sakagami (2002), other variations to their 
procedure may be responsible for the current results. Ishii and Sakagami (2002) 
employed a central key in their procedure. The subjects had to make a response on 
it to initiate a trial. It is unclear how the exclusion of the central key would be a 
source of the current results. As the onset of the LL key was also the start of a 
trial, it was assumed that the onset of the LL key should signal the start of a trial 
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by default. However, it is noted that where a forced choice trial only involved the 
presentation of the SS key, there was no signal indicating the start of that trial. 
Thus, the contingencies the subjects experienced in the forced choice trials may 
not be the same as the contingencies experienced in the free choice trials. 
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to organise a central key so that the subjects are 
required to make a response to initiate a trial. 
The other variation was using 2 s reinforcer duration as the SS outcome 
instead of 1.5 s reinforcer duration used by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). This 
variation should not have produced the current results. According to the 
discounting framework, a discounting function of the LL outcome should exist 
regardless of the different sizes of the SS outcome. Moreover, as mentioned, 2 s 
reinforcer duration is often used as the SS outcome in self-control experiments 
with hens as subjects (e.g., McEwan, 1989; McBriar, 1999). Other studies using 
pigeons as subjects also used 2 s reinforcer duration as the SS outcome, such as 
Green et al. (1981). Thus, it does not seem necessary to shorten the 2 s reinforcer 
duration. 
The results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 showed that the subjects 
chose the SS outcome regardless of the changing SOA values. For most of the 
subjects, the number of the trials in which they encountered the LL outcome was 
about four out of a total of 48 trials per session. Thus, it seemed necessary to 
organise several days of forced choice trials to “remind” them of the LL outcome 
associated with the LL key.  
Overall, the current results continued to show that the subjects exclusively 
chose the SS outcome, irrespective of the different SOA values. It was suggested 
that the possible colour bias might be a source of the current results. The possible 
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colour bias should be eliminated by replacing the red and green colours. Also, 
since the current procedure varied from Ishii and Sakagami (2002), it seemed that 
the variations might be responsible for the current results. Hence, the Experiment 
3 will employ a central key to initiate a trial. Although the reinforcer duration 
used in the current experiment differed from that used in Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002), it should not have caused the exclusive preference for the SS outcome. 
Finally, in order to make the subjects experience the LL outcome more often, a 
number of sessions involving only forced choice trials will be organised in 
Experiment 3.  
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EXPERIMENT 3 
The previous two experiments both resulted in subjects choosing SS 
outcome exclusively across different SOA values, which did not replicate the 
results obtained by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). Several possible problems that 
contributing to these results were suggested, including possible colour bias, as 
well as excluding a central key to initiate a trial. 
In response to the possible colour bias, the present experiment will use 
yellow and blue keys to replace the previous green and red keys. Although 
hypothetically, different colours may be preferred at the same time, it seemed 
highly unlikely that the subjects will prefer both the previous green colour and the 
new colours. A central key will also be introduced in the current experiment so 
that the hens will have to make a response on this key to start a trial as arranged 
by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). Finally, six days of forced choice trial sessions 
were organised to ensure the subjects experienced the LL outcome. 
!
 
  
 
 
!
!
!
!
!
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Same as Experiment 2. 
 
Apparatus 
Same as Experiment 2, except that both side keys could be either lit blue 
or yellow, instead of red or green. The yellow key was associated with the FI 10 
schedule and the LL outcome. Thus, the yellow key was the new LL key. The 
blue key was associated with the FR 1 schedule and the SS outcome, and hence, it 
was the SS key. The central key that was previously installed (see Method in 
Experiment 1) was operative in this experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Before the commencement of Experiment 3, six days of forced choice 
trials training sessions were conducted. One session consisted of 20 trials. Each 
trial started with the central key lit white, requiring a single peck to initiate the 
trial. In each trial, either of the LL or SS key was lit. In half of the trials, only the 
SS key was presented, while in the other half of the trials, only the LL key was 
presented. The presentation of the either key was distributed randomly and evenly 
between both sides across all trials. In the trials where SS key was presented, each 
of the 10 SOA values was used. The order of the 10 SOA values was randomly 
determined. 
The experiment sessions were run the same as Experiment 2, except that 
the central key was lit white before each trial, including forced choice trials. A 
peck on the central key was required to initiate the trial. Moreover, the blue and 
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yellow keys were used instead of the red and green keys. The blue key and the 
yellow key were distributed randomly and evenly between both sides across the 
forced choice trials and the free choice trials, as organised in Experiment 2.  
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RESULTS 
The performance of each subject was judged to be stable when two series 
had produced similar data. The order in which the ascending and descending 
series were completed is presented in Table 3. The data from the last ascending 
and descending series for each subject were used to calculate the following: the 
proportion of the LL choices made at each SOA value; the number of the LL 
responses and the corresponding response rate; the latency of the SS choice; the 
number of the LL responses between the onset of SS key and SS responses (called 
the switching responses); as well as the cumulative responses on the LL key per 
trial.  
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of the LL choices as a function of the 
changing SOA in the last two series. The SS outcome continued to be chosen 
almost every time in the present experiment across all subjects except subject 92. 
Specifically, in both series the proportion of the LL choices made by subject 96 
was 0.0 regardless of the SOA values. For subjects 91, 93, 94 and 95, results also 
showed that these hens exclusively chose the SS outcome in both series with only 
few occasional sampling of the LL outcome. However, the results for subject 92 
showed relatively higher proportions of LL choices than other subjects. Notably, 
in the descending series, the proportion reached 0.42 when 2 s SOA was used.  
 
 
Table 3 
The order of the series completed by each subject in Experiment 3 
Hen 
91 92 93 94 95 96 
d, a, d d, a, d, a, d d, a, d, a d, a, d d, a, d d, a, d 
Note. a and d indicate the ascending series and the descending series respectively. !
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!
!
!
!
Figure 3.1. Proportion of the LL outcome chosen as a function of the schedule 
onset asynchrony for each hen in Experiment 3. The cross (+) 
represents the ascending series, and the circle (!) represents the 
descending series. 
!
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Moreover, the proportions of LL choices made by subject 92 seemed to be 
negatively correlated with the SOA values. That is, relatively higher proportions 
of LL choices were noted when the smaller SOA values were used. Nevertheless, 
this relation was not clear as much lower proportions can be seen when 0 and 1 s 
SOA values were in effect, compared to the proportions obtained when 2 and 3 s 
SOA values were used. 
Figure 3.2 presents the response rate on the LL key for each SOA value in 
the last ascending and descending series. Figure 3.3 is the corresponding mean 
number of responses on the LL key for each SOA value in both series. Figure 3.2 
showed that the response rates by all subjects generally increased as the SOA 
value increased. Likewise, Figure 3.3 showed that the session mean number of 
responses on LL key increased as the SOA increased. However, it is notable that 
the mean number of responses on the LL key was very small for all subjects apart 
from the results for subject 96 under the condition where the SOA values were 
smaller than 4 s. For example, the mean numbers of responses on the LL key by 
subject 94 remained very close to 0.0 when the SOA values were 0 to 4 s. This 
was also reflected in Figure 3.2 that the subjects 91 to 95 generated much lower 
response rates compared to subject 96.  
Figure 3.4 presents mean latency to respond on the SS key after its onset 
for each SOA value in the both series. It can be noticed that the latencies to make 
the SS response were mostly within 2 s. The exceptions were that the mean 
latencies were around 2.5 to 3.5 s when the SOA values were 2 and 3 s for subject 
91. For subjects 93, 95 and 96, the latencies of the SS response were around 1 s at 
all SOA values. Across all subjects, the latencies were not related to the increment 
of the SOA value. 
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Figure 3.2. Responses rate on the LL key for each hen of the last two series of 
each SOA value in Experiment 3. The cross (+) represents the 
ascending series, and the filled circle (") represents the descending 
series. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean number of responses on the LL key for each hen of the last two 
series of each SOA value in Experiment 3. The cross (+) represents 
the ascending series, and the filled circle (") represents the 
descending series. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean latency to respond on the SS key after its onset for each hen of 
the last two series of each SOA value in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 3.5 presents the mean number of the switching responses. For each 
subject, the mean number of switching responses was small. There was an 
increasing mean number of switching responses as the SOA increased. Overall, all 
subjects tended respond on the SS key after its onset with rare occasions where 
they responded on the LL key first before the SS response. 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 present cumulative responses on the LL key 
before the onset of SS key. The data in Figure 3.6 were taken from the 9 s SOA 
session in the last ascending series, while the data in Figure 3.7 were from the 9 s 
SOA session of the last descending series. Both figures showed that the subjects 
tended to either respond on the LL key before SS key onset in a constant and 
steady pattern, or not respond on the LL key at all. Although the sessions of the 
other SOA values were not analysed, significant differences were not expected as 
there were generally very low numbers of responses made on the LL key. Further 
analysis of the data taken from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 also showed 
similar results. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean number of responses made on the LL key between the onset of 
the SS key and the SS response on trial basis for each hen of the last 
two series of each SOA value in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 3.6. Cumulative responses on the LL key between the onset of the LL and 
the SS keys from the 9 s SOA session of the last ascending series for 
each subject in Experiment 3. The unfilled circle (!) represents the 
onset of the LL key, the linked filled circle (") represents the 
cumulative number of responses made on the LL key, and the cross 
(+) represents the onset of the SS key. 
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Figure 3.7. Cumulative responses on the LL key between the onset of the LL and 
the SS keys from the 9 s SOA session of the last descending series for 
each subject in Experiment 3. The unfilled circle (!) represents the 
onset of the LL key, the linked filled circle (") represents the 
cumulative number of responses made on the LL key, and the cross 
(+) represents the onset of the SS key. 
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DISCUSSION 
Experiment 3 attempted to address the possible problems that might have 
led to the SS outcome being exclusively chosen in the last two experiments. 
Possible colour bias was addressed by replacing red and green colours with blue 
and yellow colours. The previously excluded central key was included in the 
current procedure as used by Ishii and Sakagami (2002) to account for any 
possible effects of this variation on the results. Also, six days of forced choice 
trials were arranged to ensure the subjects experienced the LL outcome.  
While Ishii and Sakagami (2002) showed changes in preference as the 
SOA value increased, the present study continued to show that the SS outcome 
was almost exclusively chosen by all subjects at all SOA values with the 
exception of subject 92. The proportion of LL choices for subject 92 was larger 
when the SOA values were smaller. That is, her performance was the opposite of 
the results obtained by Ishii and Sakagami (2002) and the prediction made by the 
discounting framework (see Figure 0.1). It is unclear why subject 92’s 
performance deviated from rest of the subjects as the same contingencies applied 
to all the hens. 
As previously noted, the response rates on the LL key for all subjects were 
not high. Specifically, the response rate was under 20 responses per minute on 
average for at least four out of six subjects. In contrast, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) 
showed that for three of their subjects, the response rate was more than 100 
responses per minute on average, with one pigeon producing around 200 
responses per minute when the SOA increased. The remaining two of their 
subjects responded around 60 to 70 responses per minute on average. It may be 
argued that the domestic hens may be slower in responding, and hence, did not 
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produce similar response rates. However, Foster, Blackman and Temple (1997) 
used domestic hens in their study, and reported response rates up to around 200 
responses per minute. Although the current subjects were capable to produce a 
response rate comparable to pigeons, their response rates were much lower than 
those reported by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). Moreover, with low number of 
responses made on the LL key seen in Figure 3.3, particularly when the smaller 
SOA values were used, it seemed that most of the subjects often just waited for 
the onset of the SS key without attempts to respond on the LL key. This was also 
confirmed in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, in which it is noted that during some 
trials, the hens simply waited for the onset of SS key without responding on the 
LL key. Nevertheless, both the current study and Ishii and Sakagami (2002) 
showed that the response rates either increased or stayed about the same as the 
SOA increased.  
Analysis of the latencies of SS choices (Figure 3.4) and mean number of 
switching responses (Figure 3.5) suggested that all subjects tended to make an SS 
response within 1 to 2 s after the onset of SS key with rare occasional switching 
responses made within 1 to 2 s. Ishii and Sakagami (2002) presented the 
switching responses on session basis, and thus, it seemed that there were more 
responses in total than the current study. However, if their results were calculated 
based on the average number of switching responses per trial as was done in the 
current study, their findings on the switching responses for most of their subjects 
should be comparable to the current results. However, some differences are noted. 
The number of LL responses decreased in general as the SOA value increased in 
Ishii and Sakagami (2002), while the current study showed that the number of 
responses either increased or stayed similar as the SOA increased. This difference 
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may be a result of dependent measures of the proportion of SS choices and of the 
switching responses. To measure these switching responses, two following 
conditions needed to be met: the SS key onset and the SS choice. Thus, the 
decreasing number of switching responses in Ishii and Sakagami (2002) was a 
direct result of less SS choices made as SOA increased. This was not the case in 
the current study as the current subjects continued to choose SS outcome 
regardless of the different SOA values.  
Breakdown of the events in the trials at the 9 s SOA in the last two series 
(Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7) was to investigate the LL responding pattern. As all 
subjects had experienced the contingencies on the LL key, it should be assumed 
that the responding on the LL key was under the control of the contingencies on 
the LL key. Thus, the responding on the LL key should resemble the performance 
under a typical FI schedule. In other words, the response rates should accelerate as 
a function of delay to LL outcome (called FI scalloped pattern, see Ferster and 
Skinner, 1957). However, it is clearly not the case as the subjects either responded 
on the LL key in a constant and steady fashion or made only few or no responses 
on the LL key.  
It may be argued that the current subjects were not sensitive to the passage 
of time. However, Taylor, Haskell, Appleby and Waran (2002) investigated the 
timing ability of domestic hens. Their results showed that the response rate 
accelerated when the time to the expected reinforcer was shortened. They 
concluded that domestic hens should be able to estimate when the reinforcer 
would be available, if there was a signal indicating the forthcoming reinforcer 
several minutes in advance. Thus, it seemed these current subjects should be able 
to estimate the delay. 
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This finding of lack of FI scalloped response pattern may be a result of the 
later onset of SS key. Theoretically, the responses on the LL key should be under 
the control of the contingencies on the LL key regardless of the contingencies on 
the SS key. However, Ferster and Skinner (1957) reported that in a concurrent 
schedule, when a response on one key is followed by a previously reinforced 
response on the other, the responses on that key would not only be under the 
control of the contingencies associated with that key but also under the control of 
the contingencies associated with the other key. In other words, the response 
pattern will be changed as the responses became controlled by the contingencies 
on both keys. This seemed to explain the lack of FI scalloped response pattern on 
the LL key as observed in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. How well this argument can 
be applied to the current study is not clear. As Ishii and Sakagami (2002) did not 
report the cumulative responses in the trials, a comparison cannot be made. 
However, this should support the possibility that the later onset of SS key may 
actually change the responses on the LL key. 
The above argument raises the possibility that the current results were 
actually due to the procedure employed. As noted, the present procedure failed to 
demonstrate changes in preference. However, conventional self-control studies 
with different procedural components have repeatedly shown preference shifts as 
a function of delay, such as Rachlin and Green (1972) and Green et al. (1981). 
Thus, comparison between the two procedures may address the question as to 
whether the current findings were a consequence of using an unconventional 
procedure. 
First, the current study used an asynchronous presentation of the two keys 
(and hence a part of research question in the beginning) while a conventional self-
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control study uses simultaneous presentation of the two stimuli (e.g., Rachlin & 
Green, 1972; Green et al., 1981). As discussed, the arrangement of the later onset 
of SS key may change the response pattern on the LL key. However, in concurrent 
schedules, subjects tend to switch from one key to the other, and they can always 
switch back. Thus, the subjects can maximise the total payoff through switching, 
and hence, the responses on one key would also be under the control of the other 
(Ferster & Skinner, 1957). However, in the current procedure, switching from the 
LL key to the SS key would only minimise the payoff since only the SS outcome 
would be available. Thus, although it is possible that the changed FI response 
pattern may be due to the SS key, it is unclear if the choice making would be 
affected by the later onset of SS key. 
Second, in a conventional self-control procedure, two FR 1 schedules on 
two keys (i.e., discrete trial procedure) are organised. A response on either of 
them would be a choice, making the other option unavailable, but the current 
study used an FI 10 s schedule associated with the LL key and an FR 1 schedule 
associated with the SS key. A response on the LL key after SS key onset will not 
terminate the SS key, thus making SS key constantly available until the receipt of 
either reinforcer. A literature search revealed some comparable studies using 
similar schedule arrangements. An early study by Ainslie (1974) organised a 
procedure in which pigeons could wait for an LL outcome or respond on a key to 
receive an SS outcome. The waiting for the LL outcome could not terminate the 
SS alternative. As a result, the SS outcome was constantly available until either 
outcome was available. His results showed that in 95% of the trials, eight out of 
10 subjects responded on the SS key and received the SS outcome. Thus, it seems 
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that having an alternative always available during the waiting may enhance 
impulsivity. 
Another experiment by Logue and Peña-Correal (1984) involved a similar 
procedure with varied delay to reinforcer. They organised two keys. A response 
on the left key would lead to an LL outcome after a delay period. However, this 
response did not affect the presence of the right key, the SS key, but a response on 
the SS key would terminate two keys and lead to an SS outcome after 0.11 s 
delay. Logue and Peña-Correal (1984) then used a fading procedure similar to the 
one that Mazur and Logue (1978) used, in which the delay to LL outcome was 
gradually increased from 0.11 to 6 s. This procedure was designed to enhance 
self-control. For example, Mazur and Logue (1978) found that the LL outcome 
was always preferred when they decreased the delay to SS outcome. 
In order to make sense of the data obtained by Logue and Peña-Correal 
(1984), two different choices, initial LL choice and final LL choice, were defined. 
Initial LL choice was defined as a subject pecking the LL key. Final LL choice 
was that the response on the LL key which led to the LL outcome. They reported 
that when the delay to the LL outcome increased to 6 s, the final LL choices 
differed from the results obtained by Mazur and Logue (1978) significantly. 
Specifically, for three out of eight subjects, the receipt of the LL outcome 
decreased to less than 10% of all outcomes. However, when the initial LL choices 
were examined, it was found that they did not differ from the results obtained by 
Mazur and Logue (1978) significantly. In other words, the switching responses 
from the LL key to the SS key may be related to the results they obtained. Logue 
and Peña-Correal (1984) argued that with a constantly available SS key, subjects 
would be more impulsive as they always have the opportunity to switch choices. 
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This arrangement may be responsible for some of the data in the current study. As 
some switching responses were seen, if the current study had employed one 
response requirement on the LL key after the SS key onset, more LL choices 
would have been made.  
However, if the above procedural components were not responsible for the 
continuous exclusive SS choices, a theoretical question is raised as to when the 
point of shifting preference would be in the current study. According to Figure 
0.1, it seemed that the temporal discounting account would be able to predict the 
shifts in preference at Time 2, but then the question is when this Time 2 was in 
the current experiment. In order to answer this question, the above-mentioned 
mathematical models of temporal discounting functions were turned to. 
Unfortunately, all models of discounting require a known discounting variable, K, 
in order to make a prediction, but the K value could not be derived until some data 
were available to put into the formula. That is, the prediction is really just a 
description. Also, to have the subjective value of LL outcome to be 0.0, all 
temporal discounting models would require the amount variable, A, to be 0.0 (see 
Equation 2), which was clearly not the case here. Although one may argue if K 
was extremely big so that the whole dominator was extremely big, it should give a 
V value close 0.0. Nevertheless, it must be noted that there was no function 
produced in the current experiment (i.e., V did not change across the SOA values), 
and thus, none of the temporal discounting functions would be able to describe the 
exclusive SS choices across all SOA values. Thus, the discounting functions are 
not able to either predict the shifting point or describe the current results. Thus, to 
answer this question, other choice models should be explored. 
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Another influential choice model for predicting and describing the choices 
when an organism faces two alternatives is the matching law. This model was not 
consulted previously. However, due to the inability of temporal discounting to 
predict or describe in current data, the matching law is called for help. The 
matching law was proposed by Herrnstein (1961). He found that the proportion of 
the responses distributed to a schedule matched the proportion of reinforcement 
obtained under that schedule. Herrnstein (1961) then expressed this relation 
mathematically as:  
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where B is the behaviour (e.g., responses or time spent on responding), and R is 
the reinforcement.  
Later, Baum and Rachlin (1969) introduced the concatenated matching 
law to predict and describe preference when two alternatives differ on several 
dimensions such as delay and reinforcer magnitude. Their new model is expressed 
as: 
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In this new model, the behaviour, B is positively related to the rate, R, and the 
magnitude of the reinforcement, A. Notably, the behaviour is inversely related to 
the delay to reinforcement, D. In other words, the longer the delay is under one 
schedule, the fewer the responses will be made under that schedule. 
In a self-control paradigm, only one reinforcer is accessible after making a 
response, and hence, the reinforcement rate, R, is 1. Thus, the concatenated 
matching law reduces to the following equation (Rachlin & Green, 1972):     
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To date, the self-control version of the concatenated matching law has been 
successful in predicting and describing laboratory self-control results, such as 
Navarick and Fantino (1976) and Rachlin and Green (1972). 
Similar to the temporal discounting framework, it has been noted that he 
generalised matching law with free parameters to exponentiate the dimensional 
variables (e.g., A and D), would provide better description of the results (e.g., 
Green & Snyderman, 1980). However, the inclusion of free parameters would 
limit the prediction power of the model if no data were generated before the use 
the generalised matching law. Nevertheless, whether adding free parameters or 
not, the prediction of current results would be the same. This is due the 
immediacy to SS outcome in the current experiment. Since the SS outcome was 
available right after a response on the SS key across all the SOA values, DSS 
would be 0 s for all SOA. According to the matching law (Equation 9), BLL would 
always be 0.0 with or without power functions. Therefore, the matching law will 
predict exclusive SS choices at all SOA values, and hence, will predict that no 
discounting functions can be observed. This should explain the current results that 
the LL outcome was rarely chosen and there were generally no LL response after 
the onset of SS key (see Figure 3.5).  
Nevertheless, Mazur (2000) argued that it would take 0.5 s for pigeons to 
move from the response key to the magazine. It seemed that 0.5 s delay to 
reinforcer should be taken into account. However, in the current study, the 
availability of the reinforcer was signalled by the magazine light alongside the 
presentation of the reinforcer. The magazine light should be considered as a 
secondary reinforcer as a result of continuous pairing with the primary reinforcer 
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(Cooper, Heron & Heward, 2007), and hence, the delay to the SS outcome should 
be considered to be 0 s. In fact, Mazur (2000) included 0.5 s delay to the SS 
outcome in his procedure in order to provide sufficient time for the subjects to 
move to the magazine. Thus, it seems plausible that the current results may be due 
to the value of the delay parameter. In other words, the delay to SS outcome 
should increase in order to generate shifts in preference as a function of different 
SOA values.  
However, there have been results not consistent with the matching law 
prediction. For example, Davison and McCarthy (1988) noticed that the matching 
law failed to predict the results from the fading procedure used by Mazur and 
Logue (1978). Moreover, Ishii and Sakagami (2002) did demonstrate systematic 
shifts in preference in their results with the use of 0 s delay to SS outcome. Thus, 
although the matching law prediction is a plausible account to the current results, 
it does seem to be premature to conclude that the exclusive SS choices were due 
to 0 s delay to SS outcome. 
However, if the unconventional procedural components and/or the use of  
0 s delay to SS outcome were responsible for the current data, the variations made 
in the Experiment 1, the corrections to these variations in Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3, as well as replacing the two colours were irrelevant to the results.  
This should explain why the data obtained in all three experiments were extremely 
similar, 
In addition to the above accounts, it should be noted that species employed 
by Ishii and Sakagami (2002) were pigeons while the current study used domestic 
hens. If species difference did exist, it may be able to explain the difference 
between the results obtained by Ishii and Sakagami (2002) and the current results. 
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Lowe and Harzem (1977) compared the responding performances of rats and 
pigeons under FT schedules. As FT requires no response, the reinforcer is not 
contingent on responses, and consequently, decreasing cost by not responding 
would be the best strategy. Their results showed that the rats quickly learned to 
decrease, and they eventually ceased responding while pigeons continued to 
respond. It seemed that the learning ability seemed to differ significantly across 
the species. If the learning of domestic hens was somehow slower than pigeons, 
the procedure would need to be modified to suit the ability of the hens. In current 
study, the SOA value either increased or decreased session by session, if the 
subjects’ behaviour failed to come under the control of the new SOA value 
quickly after the change, their performance would be interrupted by the 
contingencies associated with other SOA values. That is, they may fail to 
discriminate across the different SOA values quickly, despite that they have the 
ability to estimate the delay. Likewise, since the subjects experienced the SS 
outcome most of the time (and thus the contingencies associated with the SS key), 
fewer opportunities were provided for the subjects to experience the LL outcome. 
Thus, it is also possible that the performance did not come under the control of the 
contingencies on the LL key at all. If this is true, it may explain the lack of the FI 
scalloped response pattern seen above. 
Tobin and Logue (1994) demonstrated that pigeons were more impulsive 
than rats while both pigeons and rats were more impulsive than human, when 
food was offered as a reinforcer. In other words, the degree of self-control 
differed across different species. Hence, it is reasonable to expect different 
degrees of self-control between pigeons and domestic hens. However, it is unclear 
why the differences were so large.  
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Overall, several accounts of possible sources responsible for the current 
results were discussed, including the use of the unconventional self-control 
procedure, 0 s delay to SS outcome, as well as possible species differences. In 
order to investigate which account is most plausible, in Experiment 4, the 
domestic hens will be placed in a conventional self-control procedure as used by 
Green et al. (1981). Thus, the two stimuli will be presented simultaneously with 
only one response required to make a choice and the delay to SS outcome will be 
relatively longer. Since Green et al. (1981) also used pigeons in their study, if the 
domestic hens choose the SS outcome exclusively in this procedure, a species 
difference may be concluded as a source for the exclusive SS choices in 
Experiment 1 to Experiment 3. If the hens shift preference so that the LL outcome 
becomes preferred as T increases, it is possible that the current results were a 
consequence of using an unconventional self-control procedure and/or the 0 s 
delay to SS outcome.  
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EXPERIMENT 4 
The previous three experiments all produced data showing exclusive 
choices for the SS outcome. It was suggested that the previous experiments did 
not produce shifts in preference due to the unconventional self-control procedural 
components, the 0 s delay to SS outcome, or the different species being used in 
the current study. However, it was not conclusive which of the above accounts 
was responsible for the results in these experiments. To address this question, it is 
necessary to investigate if a conventional self-control procedure would produce 
shifts in preference with domestic hens. 
Experiment 4 will replicate Green et al. (1981) using a conventional self-
control procedure based on discrete trials. In Green et al. (1981), pigeons had to 
make one response to choose between two alternatives that were simultaneously 
presented. The delays to both outcomes were longer than 0 s. Thus, if the 
performance by the hens is comparable to the performance by the pigeons in 
Green et al. (1981), it is possible that the procedure used in Ishii and Sakagami 
(2002) may not be able to produce changes in preference. If the species difference 
was the reason for the previous data, the performance by the hens should continue 
to show impulsivity as they did in the previous experiments.  
The performance of the previous subjects may be affected by the 
contingencies in Experiment 1 to Experiment 3. In other words, they may 
continue to choose the SS outcome exclusively as a result of the previous 
reinforcement history. Thus, six new hens will also be employed to see if they 
will demonstrate self-control, and hence, will serve to examine if the previous 
reinforcement history will affect the choices made by previously employed 
subjects in Experiment 4. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
In addition to subjects 91 to 96 from the previous three experiments, 
another five Brown Shaver hens (numbered 101, 102, 103, 104 and 106) served in 
this experiment. All five new hens were approximately three years old at the 
commencement of this experiment, and had all participated in experiments 
previously. The weights, feed and conditions that the new hens housed were all 
the same as those for subjects 91 to 96. 
 
Apparatus 
Same as Experiment 1, with the houselight (see Method in Experiment 1) 
operative in this experiment.  
 
Procedure 
An experimental session consisted of 16 forced choice trials preceding 44 
free choice trials. It was completed when all trials had finished or 40 min had 
passed.  
 The sequence of experimental events in a free choice trial was presented 
in Figure 4.1. Each free choice trial lasted for 30 s, and was followed by 10 s 
outcome period. A trial started with the onset of houselight. T was the time 
between onset of keys and the end of trial period, and varied between 2 and 28 s. 
After 30 – T s, both side keys were lit. The side keys in this experiment could be 
lit either red or green. The red key was associated with 2 s access to wheat (the SS 
outcome) and the following 8 s blackout in the outcome period. Thus, the red key 
was the SS key. The green key was associated with 4 s blackout followed by 6 s  
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Figure 4.1. The sequence of the experimental events in a free choice trial for 
Experiment 4. 
 
 
 
 
Houselight onset 
LL key 
onset 
SS key 
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30 – T s 
All lights extinguished 
T s 
s s 
T s 
s s 
!
SS outcome 
!
LL outcome 
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access to wheat (the LL outcome). Thus, the green key was the LL key. The two 
colours, their associated contingencies and the correspondent outcome periods 
were randomly and evenly distributed between the two sides. Once the subject 
had made a choice by making a response on either of lit keys, the other key was 
extinguished immediately, and only houselight and the chosen key were lit until 
the end of trial period. A subject could respond on the chosen key during T s delay 
but responding had no effect. Once T s delay had passed, the houselight was 
extinguished and 10 s outcome period started. Whether the SS or LL outcome 
period was in effect depended on the key the subject had pecked in the trial 
period. For example, if the subject responded on the SS key, only the SS key and 
the houselight would be lit. After T s delay, the houselight would be extinguished 
and the SS outcome would become available without any further delay, followed 
by 8 s blackout. If the LL key was chosen in the trial period, after T s delay, 4 s 
blackout would be in effect, followed by the LL outcome. If no response was 
made during a trial, this trial was regarded as an aborted trial and ended with 10 s 
blackout.  
The preceding 16 forced choice trials were only different from the free 
choice trials in that only one key was lit during a forced choice trial. Either of the 
SS and LL keys and its correspondent contingencies were effective in half of the 
forced choice trials. 
In Green et al. (1981), the time, T, varied across seven values. Due to the 
time constraints, only two extreme values, 2 and 28 s from Green et al. (1981) 
were used in order to show if the domestic hens would demonstrate preference 
shifts quickly. In Green et al. (1981), each T value was used for a minimum of 15 
days, and T was only changed when the last five days had produced seemingly 
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stable proportions of choice. Also due to the time constraint, the stability criterion 
in the current experiment only required choice proportions to be stable for five 
days, and then the T value was changed. 
As mentioned, the six new hens were employed to examine if they could 
demonstrate self-control and their results were comparable to the results generated 
by the previously employed five subjects. The six new hens only served under the 
condition where 28 s T value was used. 
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RESULTS 
The data from the last five sessions of each condition, using 2 and 28 s T 
values, were used to calculate the following: the proportion of the LL choices, the 
mean latency to choice, and the response rate (in seconds). The number of days 
that the each subject served is presented in Table 4. 
Figure 4.2 presents the proportion of the LL outcome chosen by each 
subject in each condition. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 4.2, all of the 
previously employed subjects (subjects 91 to 96) chose the SS outcome most of 
the time except subject 93. Higher proportions of LL choices when T was 28 s 
than when T was 2 s can be seen for subjects 92 to 96. The differences in the 
proportions of the LL choices between two conditions were within 0.2 for all 
subjects except subject 93. It can be seen that subject 91 produced a slightly 
higher proportion of LL choices when T was 2 s. Also, subject 93 demonstrated 
relatively higher proportion of LL choices when T was 28 s, which reached 
around 0.5. However, the performance of subject 93 under the condition of 28 s T 
delay was related to the position preference favouring the right side. She made 
90% of the choices in the last five sessions on the right key. 
!
!
Table 4 
The days each subject served in Experiment 4 
Hen Days (T = 2 s) Days (T = 28 s) Hen Days (T = 28 s) 
91 8 7 101 12 
92 7 7 102 12 
93 8 7 103 12 
94 8 7 104                            10 
95     7 7 106 12  
96 8 7   
Note. Subject 106 stopped after 12 days but her performance did not meet the 
stability criterion. 
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Figure 4.2. Proportions of the LL outcome chosen when T was 2 and 28 s for each 
subject in Experiment 4. The cross (+) represents the condition when 
T was 2 s. The circle (!) represents the condition when T was 28 s. 
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The results for subjects 101, 102, 103, 104 and 106 are presented in the !
lower panel of Figure 4.2. Figure 4.2 showed that these new subjects also 
demonstrated preferences for the SS outcome. For three out of the five new 
subjects, subjects 101 to 103, proportions of LL choices were around 0.1, and 
hence, comparable to the results from the previously employed subjects. The 
remaining two subjects, 104 and 106 showed higher proportions of LL choices. 
However, the performance of subject 106 was also related to the extreme 
preference towards the right key. She made more than 90% of choices on the right 
key in the last three sessions. 
Figure 4.3 presents the latencies to choice for both groups of subjects. 
Similar to Figure 4.2, the upper panel shows the results from the previously 
employed subjects under the condition where T were 2 and 28 s, while the lower 
panel shows the results from the five new subjects when T was 28 s. When T was 
28 s, the latencies to choice were significantly longer than when T was 2 s. The 
results from the new subjects were similar to those produced by the previous 
subjects. Specifically, for the previously employed subjects, the latencies to 
choice were around 1 s when T was 2 s, while the latencies reached around 8 to  
12 s when T was 28 s. For the new subjects, although the latency for subject 102 
was relatively shorter (around 6 s), latencies for the remaining new subjects varied 
from 10 to 12 s, and thus, similar to those obtained for subjects 91 to 96.  
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 present the mean responses per second on the SS 
and the LL keys for both groups of subjects. Figure 4.4 shows that the response 
rates for the previous six subjects were generally higher when T was 2 s than 
when T was 28 s. Also, the SS response rates were higher than the LL response 
rates in both conditions. However, the SS response rates were much higher than  
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Figure 4.3. Mean latencies to choice when T was 2 and 28 s for each subject in 
Experiment 4. The cross (+) represents the condition when T was 2 s. 
The circle (!) represents the condition when T was 28 s. 
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the LL response rates when T was 2 s. Figure 4.5 shows the response rates for the 
five new subjects when T was 28 s. Similarly, the SS response rates for these new 
hens were slightly higher than the LL response rates, and these response rates 
were comparable to what was obtained by the previous subjects. 
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Figure 4.4. Mean responses per second on LL and SS keys when T was 2 and 28 s 
for each of the previously employed six subjects (subjects 91 to 96) in 
Experiment 4. The cross (+) represents the SS response rate. The 
circle (!) represents the LL response rate. 
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Figure 4.5. Mean responses per second on LL and SS keys when T was 28 s for 
each of the five new subjects (subjects 101, 102, 103, 104 and 106) in 
Experiment 4. The cross (+) represents the SS response rate. The 
circle (!) represents the LL response rate. 
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DISCUSSION 
Experiment 4 attempted to replicate Green et al. (1981) in order to 
examine if the conventional self-control procedure would produce preference 
shifts with domestic hens. The findings showed that the current experiment failed 
to obtain the results similar to those obtained by Green et al. (1981). Green et al. 
(1981) showed that all their subjects strongly preferred the SS outcome when T 
was 2 s, while the LL outcome was strongly preferred when T was 28 s. In the 
current experiment, while the data obtained when T was 2 s were comparable to 
Green et al. (1981), the data from most subjects showed that the proportions of the 
LL choices only slight raised when T was 28 s. Hence, no preference shifts were 
observed.  
Analysis of latencies to choice when T were 2 and 28 s did not differ from 
Green et al. (1981). There were generally shorter latencies (around 1 s) when T 
was 2 s, and longer latencies (around 10 to 12 s) when T was 28 s. Given that if a 
response was not made within 2 s when T was 2 s, the subject would not receive 
the reinforcer at all, it was expected the latencies to choice to be within 2 s when T 
was 2 s. Green et al. (1981) also argued that the increased latencies as the value of 
T increased were a result of response strength being inversely related to the delay 
(or T value) to the reinforcer. This should explain the increased latencies when T 
was 28 s in the current results. 
The above account also confirmed that the response rates were slower 
when T was 28 s as shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. This could be a direct 
result of a longer delay. The contingencies in the current experiment required only 
one response to make a choice within the delay. One response in 2 s would 
naturally produce higher response rate than one response in 28 s. In addition, for 
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both conditions, the LL response rates were generally lower than the SS response 
rates. This seemed to be a result of response strength being inversely related to the 
delay as mentioned previously. Accordingly, since the contingencies associated 
with the LL key involved a longer delay to reinforcement than the contingencies 
with the SS key, response rates on LL key should be lower. 
 Comparing the response rates generated in the current experiment to the 
response rates in Green et al. (1981), when T was 2 s, the current response rates 
were lower than those obtained by Green et al. (1981). For example, Green et al. 
(1981) reported that the response rates were up to 2.5 responses per second while 
results from the current experiment found response rates were up to around 1.6 
responses per second. It was noted in Experiment 3 that domestic hens are capable 
to produce around 200 responses per minute, or around 3 responses per second. 
Thus, this difference does not seem to be a consequence of species difference. 
However, it is not clear how this difference was relevant to choice making.  
As mentioned, shifting preference was not observed in the current 
experiment, but higher proportions of LL choices were noticed for all subjects 
when T was 28 s. This raised a concern regarding procedural variations. As 
outlined, due to the time constraint, the current procedure deviated from Green et 
al. (1981) in two aspects, one was the use of only two extreme values, and the 
other was the stability criterion. The use of the two extreme values can be justified 
because shifting preference is not a result of ascending or descending series, but a 
result of different delay values. Therefore, this variation is plausible.  
The second variation was the change of stability criterion, and this may 
produce the lack of shifts in preference as observed. Green et al. (1981) had each 
subject on one condition for at least 15 days and the condition changed only when 
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the results from the last five days appeared stable, while in the current experiment, 
the stability criterion only required that the results from the last five days appear 
stable. This may produce the discrepancies between the current results and the 
results obtained by Green et al. (1981) because the subjects in Green et al. (1981) 
had more experience than the current birds since the current birds only completed 
up to a total of 12 days.  
This could also explain the results from subjects 93 and 106 that they 
showed extreme position bias in favour of the right key. For example, subject 93 
suddenly started to show position bias in the condition when T was 28 s with no 
signs of bias in the previous condition where T was 2 s. Subject 106 only showed 
position bias in the last 3 sessions and her proportions of LL choices was not 
stable during the condition in which T was 28 s. It seemed that they failed to 
discriminate between the contingencies, and hence, the position bias was 
developed and resulted in the equal preference for the outcomes.  
If a large number of experimental sessions were conducted, subjects 93 
and 106 would have had more experiences with both contingencies. As a result, 
discrimination between the consequences should be acquired, and should have 
resulted in the elimination of position bias, and possibly shifting preference. Thus, 
it may be suggested that the demonstration of position bias may actually be a part 
of learning process. If this was true for these two subjects, this could also be true 
for the remaining subjects. That is, the remaining subjects may seem to be stable 
at this point, but they may have started to show position bias at a later time before 
showing shifts in preference. However, Green et al. (1981) failed justify the use of 
15 days as a part of stability criterion. They did not report how many sessions that 
each subject took to meet stability or the data obtained during these sessions 
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before the stability was met. Thus, no conclusions can be made on this account at 
this point. 
Experiment 4 also raised a theoretical question as to whether either of the 
two choice models (temporal discounting and the matching law) can describe the 
current results. If they can, they may shed some light on the current results. As 
mentioned, the matching law (Equation 9) has provided accurate prediction and 
description for the results by Navarick and Fantino (1976) and Rachlin and Green 
(1972), and it did predict the results from Experiment 3. For Experiment 4, the 
matching law would predict that at 28 s T delay, the LL outcome should be 
favoured. Accordingly, the subjects’ behaviour did not follow the prediction of 
the matching law. Nevertheless, latencies to choice were noted, and according to 
the matching law, the later the choices were, the more likely the SS outcome was 
preferred. Even if the latencies were taken into account, the matching law would 
still predict the LL outcome to be preferred. It is highly unlikely that the 
preference of domestic hens cannot be described by the matching law. For 
example, Tannahill (2004) successfully employed the matching law to measure 
social preference in hens. 
It should be noted that the matching law used in predicting the current 
results was the strict matching law, while Tannahill (2004) used the generalised 
matching law. Also, as noted in Experiment 3, the generalised matching law with 
added power functions should provide better description than its strict version 
(while sacrificing its power of prediction). Thus, the generalised matching law 
might be able to describe the current results. A form of the generalised matching 
law is presented here (Green & Snyderman, 1980): 
78 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! 
B
LL
B
SS
= k
A
LL
A
SS
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
x
•
D
SS
D
LL
" 
# 
$ $ 
% 
& 
' ' 
y
!
,                                     (10) 
in which k is the measure of bias, and x and y are the “measures of the potencies 
of delay and amount of reinforcement as determinants of choice” (p. 144). Using 
the parameters in Experiment 4, supposing there were no bias towards either 
outcome (k =1) and no latencies to choice, the generalised matching law still can 
describe the current data with a very small x value (e.g., x < 0.4) and a very large 
y value (e.g., y > 18). Thus, with three free parameters, the generalised matching 
law can actually describe the current results. Similar arguments can also be 
derived from the temporal discounting functions (e.g., Equation 2) with a large 
discounting value, K. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that the key to explain 
the lack of preference shifts with domestic hens here may be the values used in 
the parameters.  
Abeyesinghe, Nicol, Hartnell and Wathes (2005) employed domestic hens 
under two contingencies, 2 s delay and 3 s access to food as the SS contingencies, 
and 6 s delay and 22 s access to food as the LL contingencies (called jackpot 
condition). They successfully demonstrated self-control. However, when the LL 
contingencies were 22 s delay and 22 s access to food (called standard self-control 
condition), their subjects were impulsive. Although they tried to demonstrate that 
the lack of preference shifts in standard self-control condition was due to the long 
delay, it should be noted that the difference between the magnitudes of the two 
outcomes in Abeyesinghe et al. (2005) was very large while this difference in the 
current study was relatively small. 
Both Green et al. (1981) and Ishii and Sakagami (2002) used pigeons in 
their studies while current study employed domestic hens. The magnitude 
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difference between reinforcers in current study was similar to the difference used 
in the studies with pigeons while a bigger reinforcer difference was used with 
domestic hens in Abeyesinghe et al. (2005). Thus, although it is not understood 
why the discrepancies in the results were so large between the two species, it is 
still sensible to suspect the difference in parameter values used with pigeons 
cannot be applied to domestic hens. Accordingly, it seems that the parameter 
values used with one species may not be used with another species even if the two 
species are similar.  
Overall, Experiment 4 failed to show shifts in preference, but did show 
higher proportions of LL choices when T was 28 s. The implications of procedural 
variations in this experiment was discussed that if the subjects had more time to 
experience the contingencies, they may have shown shifting preference. With the 
help of the generalised matching law and the temporal discounting functions as 
well as the comparison between the parameters used in the other self-control 
studies with domestic hens, it was suggested that the difference in reinforcer sizes 
used with pigeons may not be used with hens. Implications were discussed that 
parameter values used with one species may not be applied to another. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiment 1 to Experiment 3 attempted to employ an unconventional 
self-control procedure which involved asynchronous presentation of two 
alternatives as introduced by Ishii and Sakagami (2002). While Ishii and 
Sakagami (2002) demonstrated clear changes in preference from preferring SS 
outcome to LL outcome when SOA increased, Experiment 1 to Experiment 3 all 
showed exclusive preference for the SS outcome by most subjects despite the 
effort to correct the previous procedural variations and the continued use of forced 
choice trials in every session regardless of the SOA values. Several possible 
accounts that may be responsible for the results were discussed, including 
asynchronous onset of the alternatives, a constantly available SS alternative, the 0 
s delay to SS outcome, and the different species. 
To ascertain which account was responsible for the results in these three 
experiments, Experiment 4 used a conventional self-control procedure as used by 
Green et al. (1981) to investigate whether or not these subjects would demonstrate 
shifts in preference. New subjects were also used to examine if past reinforcement 
history affected performance by the previously employed subjects. The results 
from most subjects in Experiment 4 showed strong preference for SS outcome 
despite the T values varied. It was suggested that the differences between the 
results from Experiment 4 and Green et al. (1981) may be a result of less 
opportunity to experience the contingencies, and/or small difference between the 
two reinforcers.  
However, although no shifts in preference was shown in Experiment 4, the 
results still demonstrated higher proportions of LL choices when T was 28 s than 
when T was 2 s. This was not seen in the first three experiments where exclusive 
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SS choices were obtained regardless of the SOA. Thus, it seems that the exclusive 
choices from the first three experiments were not a consequence of using a 
different species. Without enough evidences against the use of asynchronous 
schedule onset and the constantly available SS alternative, it seems that only the 
matching law provided a plausible account. That is, the data from the first three 
experiments were due to the use of 0 s delay to SS outcome. It also seems that the 
results from Experiment 4 were due to the small difference between the reinforcer 
sizes since other accounts were without theoretical or empirical support. Thus, 
even when delay to SS outcome was longer in the first three experiments, shifting 
preference would never occur in these experiments since the difference in 
reinforcer sizes was the same in all experiments in the current study, but higher 
proportions of LL choices should be seen as SOA increases. 
It must be noted that the account that change of stability criterion that 
might have produced the results in Experiment 4 was not supported because 
Green et al. (1981) neither justified their stability criterion, nor reported the 
number of days that their subjects took to meet stability. They also failed to report 
data from the sessions before stability was met. Whether the subjects in Green et 
al. (1981) actually developed position bias or were unable to discriminate between 
the contingencies before their performance was stable remains unknown. 
Consequently, a conclusion regarding the effect of change of stability criterion in 
Experiment 4 cannot be made. This resulted in seeking help from the theoretical 
models. Thus, it is not clear whether the change of stability criterion or the small 
difference between reinforcer sizes contributed to the lack of shifting preference, 
even though it seems that the small difference between reinforcer sizes is more 
plausible with theoretical support from the matching law. 
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Similarly, in Experiment 3, Ishii and Sakgami (2002) failed to report the 
reason for using a central key. Since the current experiment continued to show 
exclusive SS choices with the inclusion of the central key (see Experiment 4), the 
effect of the central key is left in question. Also, in Experiment 3, it was noticed 
that the FI scalloped pattern was not apparent when the responses were made 
under an FI schedule. Hence, it was suspected that the responding on one schedule 
might have been disrupted by the later onset of another schedule. Unfortunately, 
this account cannot be validated either because Ishii and Sakagami (2002) did not 
report the patterns of responses on the FI schedule in their study. This also made it 
impossible to investigate whether the responding on the FI schedule being 
disrupted was related to the exclusive choice making seen in the first three 
experiments. 
It is believed that the current study is not the only study that suffered from 
not reporting data and/or not acknowledging procedural components. Other 
studies replicating Green et al. (1981) or Ishii and Sakagami (2002) may face 
similar or different unanswerable questions due to this reason. Thus, an empirical 
concern is raised as to how much data should be reported and how many 
procedural components should be justified in published studies, and this does 
deserve some attention in the future. 
Another concern raised in the current study was regarding the choice 
models used in the study. It is noted that the strict matching law was employed in 
Experiment 3 due to the fact that the temporal discounting functions were unable 
to make predictions with an unknown discounting variable, K, and the strict 
matching law successfully predicted and described the results from the first three 
experiments. However, in Experiment 4, the prediction made by the strict 
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matching law differed from the results remarkably (and naturally it was unable to 
describe the results either). Thus, the help from the generalised matching law was 
sought, and it can describe the results from Experiment 4. However, similar to the 
discounting functions, the generalised matching law does not hold power of 
prediction either as it has three free parameters. Thus, none of the choice models 
employed in the current study was able to predict the results from Experiment 4. 
Nevertheless, the use of the choice models may be justified for describing 
the data rather than predicting the data. However, whether they can actually 
describe the data is also in question. For example, the temporal discounting 
functions could not describe the data generated in Experiment 3 since the 
proportions of choices did not change across the SOA values, and remained 
extremely close to 0.0. 
Furthermore, as noted, all forms of the matching law will predict exclusive 
choices with 0 s delay to reinforcer across all the SOA, while Ishii and Sagakami 
(2002) did report shifts in preference in their study. Accordingly, no forms of the 
matching law will be able to describe the preference shifts reported by Ishii and 
Sakagami (2002). The same problem comes with the discounting studies with 
humans, such as Green, Fry and Myerson (1994), in which the delay to the 
smaller hypothetical monetary reward was 0 s and shifts in preference was 
reported. Thus, neither the generalised matching law nor the strict matching law 
can describe the data from these human studies.  
It does seem peculiar since both temporal discounting functions and 
matching law attempted to describe the allocation of choices as a function of a 
delay, and thus, should provide similar descriptions. Unfortunately, these models 
were not consistent in describing the data generated in the current study or the 
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previous studies, where 0 s delay was used. Whether 0 s delay to reinforcement 
was an exception in terms of using the two choice models to account for the data 
is not clear. However, the fact that neither the discounting functions nor the 
matching law can account for all the data produced where 0 s delay was used 
should lead to some concerns regarding the empirical use of these choice models. 
Thus, more studies are required to investigate the power of description held by the 
two models. 
Thus, whether the matching law has, in fact, provided a valid account for 
the exclusive SS choice in an asynchronous presentation of two alternatives 
remains a question, even though it seems to provide the only plausible explanation. 
Hence, it is suggested that the future studies are required to confirm that the 
results obtained by Ishii and Sakagami (2002) are actually replicable. 
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